research
some of what I've been working on
Dissertation project
My dissertation will study the political implications of growing job precarity across multiple levels of the labor market. This trend has upended the implicit social contract traditionally held in higher-income positions, in which workers receive subsidized benefits through their job, while further deteriorating working conditions in lower-income positions. In the proposed set of projects, I aim to study how employment precarity, intersecting with a racially stratified and gendered labor market, impacts the political system in three different areas. First, I study how precarity influences political attitudes towards public and private modes of distributing resources, paying special attention to the legacy of the US’ employment-oriented means of distributing benefits. Next, I study how precarity influences electoral politics, identifying changes in electoral participation and partisan identification within and between individuals over the time period of interest, then studying changes in mass partisan coalitions over the same time period at the aggregate level. Finally, I look to identify cases where the aggregate growth of precarity at local levels are associated with non-electoral mobilization, including within the workplace itself. Through these approaches, I hope to construct a better understanding of the material foundations of the political transformations that have unfolded over the last several decades.
Working papers
Conflicted coalitions: How classes respond differently to risk and what it means for center-left coalitions
Submitted response to journal's offer to revise and resubmit
Mainstream European left-wing parties have seen their traditional class base evolve in postindustrial economies. In response, these parties have adopted redistributive strategies that aim to secure positions for workers in a more volatile labor market through education and training. But how does the electoral appeal of this “social investment” paradigm compare to that of the older welfare paradigm that passively distributes benefits to the poor and inactive? Using cross-country data from two surveys, I find that the policy preferences of industrial workers respond differently to labor market precarity than do those of service sector workers, particularly sociocultural professionals. Further, industrial workers who prefer traditional welfare policies are less likely to vote for the center-left than white-collar professionals, even if those professionals hold similar policy priorities. These results help explain the center-left’s recent electoral trends while also highlighting current limitations on building cross-class political coalitions.
Democracy at work: Legislating employment relations in a changing labor market
The United States is unusual among wealthy democracies in the effort it expends to ensure its working-age population remains dependent on an employer. Roughly half its welfare effort is composed of tax subsidies for employer-provided benefits, while its residual public benefits are meager, means-tested, and often incentivize rapid labor market re-entry. Yet in recent decades the employment relationship has weakened, with work becoming more short-term across the labor market and job quality worsening, particularly in low-wage sectors. How, then, have parties and policymakers responded to a more volatile labor market in a welfare regime where work is heavily determinative of social benefits? And are some sectors addressed differently than others? I approach this question by classifying a range of policy options based on how they impact the employment relationship in the US. I then use this classification scheme to code legislation introduced in the House of Representatives during the 116th Congress. Next, I identify the cosponsors of each bill and retrieve workforce and demographic data from the US Census for each cosponsor’s respective district. By linking a representative’s legislative activity with the labor market characteristics of their district, I identify how legislators and parties are (or are not) responding to labor instability within different segments of the labor market.
A primary cause of weak parties? Evidence from US primary campaigns before 1972
Scholarship on US parties frequently identify presidential primaries as a contributor to weak parties and polarization. However, while such studies tend to identify interest groups, activists, and other policy demanders as incentives for candidates to adopt more extreme positions, it is often unclear whether the primary electorate plays the same role. I clarify this role by identifying the effects of primary campaigns on the electorate based on variation in state nomination methods before the 1972 primary reforms. I find evidence that primary campaigns informed electoral preferences during this period, building a coalition of electoral supporters rather than reacting to predetermined electoral preferences. However, primary coalition-building did not necessarily favor more extreme candidates at the expense of moderate candidates. The results run contrary to normative arguments against public participation in party affairs and emphasize the need in future studies for greater distinction between primary campaigns and the electorate.