research

Despite the persistent class gap in political participation, we know surprisingly little about how working in low-wage labor markets might affect someone’s political outlook and behavior. To better understand this relationship, I use a mixed-method approach to studying workers in an industry where wages are especially low: Fast food. Through in-depth interviews with more than 60 fast-food workers across the United States, I find that low-wage workers draw on public programs and policies that impact their income and job opportunities as signals of the responsiveness of political elites. In turn, this perception of political responsiveness influences political trust and participation, which I show through observational and experimental evidence in an original survey of more than 1,200 fast-food workers. Importantly, this relationship varies depending on the strength of local employment policies and programs, making local context important for understanding how low-wage labor influences political outcomes. The study advances our understanding of the relationship between work and political behavior

https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688231199448
Mainstream European left-wing parties have seen their traditional class base evolve in postindustrial economies. In response, these parties have adopted redistributive strategies that aim to secure positions for workers in a more volatile labor market through education and training. But how does the electoral appeal of this “social investment” paradigm compare to that of the older welfare paradigm that passively distributes benefits to the poor and inactive? Using cross-country data from two surveys, I find that the policy preferences of industrial workers respond differently to labor market precarity than do those of service sector workers, particularly sociocultural professionals. Further, industrial workers who prefer traditional welfare policies are less likely to vote for the center-left than white-collar professionals, even if those professionals hold similar policy priorities. These results help explain the center-left’s recent electoral trends while also highlighting current limitations on building cross-class political coalitions.

Under review
Despite the centrality of employment to the lives of most working-age adults, there is surpris- ingly little research on how conditions in the workplace affect political behavior. Because most jobs operate in the private sector, their internal governance is not usually believed to affect political behavior directly. However, there is reason to think that a person’s experiences within private firms might motivate participation when conditions within it are seen as connected to issues, institutions, and groups outside of it. This is particularly likely when related issues are taken up by organized groups, parties, and elites. To demonstrate, I study how differences in satisfaction with COVID-19 workplace safety policies affected voter turnout among essential workers in the United States. Using difference-in-difference (DiD) estimators, I find evidence that dissatisfaction with workplace policies increased turnout. I further use DiD designs to show the effect was mediated by issue salience, trust in government, and worker solidarity. However, these effects only occurred when a person’s attitudes toward COVID-19 safety policies aligned with those of the party with which they identified. The findings point to conditions under which private governance may impact political participation.

The United States is unusual among wealthy democracies in the effort it expends to ensure its working-age population remains dependent on an employer. Roughly half its welfare effort is composed of tax subsidies for employer-provided benefits, while its residual public benefits are meager, means-tested, and often incentivize rapid labor market re-entry. Yet in recent decades the employment relationship has weakened, with work becoming more short-term across the labor market and job quality worsening, particularly in low-wage sectors. How, then, have parties and policymakers responded to a more volatile labor market in a welfare regime where work is heavily determinative of social benefits? And are some sectors addressed differently than others? I approach this question by classifying a range of policy options based on how they impact the employment relationship in the US. I then use this classification scheme to code legislation introduced in the House of Representatives during the 116th Congress. Next, I identify the cosponsors of each bill and retrieve workforce and demographic data from the US Census for each cosponsor’s respective district. By linking a representative’s legislative activity with the labor market characteristics of their district, I identify how legislators and parties are (or are not) responding to labor instability within different segments of the labor market.

Scholarship on US parties frequently identify presidential primaries as a contributor to weak parties and polarization. However, while such studies tend to identify interest groups, activists, and other policy demanders as incentives for candidates to adopt more extreme positions, it is often unclear whether the primary electorate plays the same role. I clarify this role by identifying the effects of primary campaigns on the electorate based on variation in state nomination methods before the 1972 primary reforms. I find evidence that primary campaigns informed electoral preferences during this period, building a coalition of electoral supporters rather than reacting to predetermined electoral preferences. However, primary coalition-building did not necessarily favor more extreme candidates at the expense of moderate candidates. The results run contrary to normative arguments against public participation in party affairs and emphasize the need in future studies for greater distinction between primary campaigns and the electorate.