research

My dissertation studies how working in low-wage jobs influences political trust and engagement. There’s already a large body of research suggesting that when workplaces are more democratic – including, most notably, when workplaces are unionized – workers are more politically and civically engaged. However, most workplaces in the United States are not unionized and workers have little say over their employer’s decisions. This lack of employee voice is especially pronounced in low-wage sectors of the labor market, where substandard working conditions and violations of employment law are frequent. How, then, does the lack of control over conditions in these private spaces influence a person’s trust and engagement in civic and political affairs? When does mistrust of private authorities lead to mistrust of public authorities and of collective forms of action? And in what cases does dissatisfaction in one’s job lead to mobilization for change, whether within politics or in the workplace itself?

To address these questions, I am conducting a survey directed at workers in the fast-food and retail industries. These industries are useful for understanding the effects of limited worker voice more generally. Low union coverage, high turnover rates, and limited public oversight have traditionally enabled companies in these industries to cut costs through their labor expenses, resulting in poor pay, limited benefits, unpredictable scheduling, and other undesirable working conditions. At the same time, employment practices vary widely between different stores and outlets, even within the same fast-food or retail brand. This allows us to learn from the diversity of experiences in comparable occupations, which I plan to do through mixed-methods approaches.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688231199448>
Mainstream European left-wing parties have seen their traditional class base evolve in postindustrial economies. In response, these parties have adopted redistributive strategies that aim to secure positions for workers in a more volatile labor market through education and training. But how does the electoral appeal of this “social investment” paradigm compare to that of the older welfare paradigm that passively distributes benefits to the poor and inactive? Using cross-country data from two surveys, I find that the policy preferences of industrial workers respond differently to labor market precarity than do those of service sector workers, particularly sociocultural professionals. Further, industrial workers who prefer traditional welfare policies are less likely to vote for the center-left than white-collar professionals, even if those professionals hold similar policy priorities. These results help explain the center-left’s recent electoral trends while also highlighting current limitations on building cross-class political coalitions.

The United States is unusual among wealthy democracies in the effort it expends to ensure its working-age population remains dependent on an employer. Roughly half its welfare effort is composed of tax subsidies for employer-provided benefits, while its residual public benefits are meager, means-tested, and often incentivize rapid labor market re-entry. Yet in recent decades the employment relationship has weakened, with work becoming more short-term across the labor market and job quality worsening, particularly in low-wage sectors. How, then, have parties and policymakers responded to a more volatile labor market in a welfare regime where work is heavily determinative of social benefits? And are some sectors addressed differently than others? I approach this question by classifying a range of policy options based on how they impact the employment relationship in the US. I then use this classification scheme to code legislation introduced in the House of Representatives during the 116th Congress. Next, I identify the cosponsors of each bill and retrieve workforce and demographic data from the US Census for each cosponsor’s respective district. By linking a representative’s legislative activity with the labor market characteristics of their district, I identify how legislators and parties are (or are not) responding to labor instability within different segments of the labor market.

Scholarship on US parties frequently identify presidential primaries as a contributor to weak parties and polarization. However, while such studies tend to identify interest groups, activists, and other policy demanders as incentives for candidates to adopt more extreme positions, it is often unclear whether the primary electorate plays the same role. I clarify this role by identifying the effects of primary campaigns on the electorate based on variation in state nomination methods before the 1972 primary reforms. I find evidence that primary campaigns informed electoral preferences during this period, building a coalition of electoral supporters rather than reacting to predetermined electoral preferences. However, primary coalition-building did not necessarily favor more extreme candidates at the expense of moderate candidates. The results run contrary to normative arguments against public participation in party affairs and emphasize the need in future studies for greater distinction between primary campaigns and the electorate.